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regulations by the fire marshal and board of health, recovered
judgment for their value in Walters v. Coen.4
SECURITY DEVICES
Joseph Dainow*
PRIVILEGES
The Revised Statutes of 1870 contained provisions1 which
created a special privilege in favor of attorneys "on all judg-
ments" obtained by them as a security for the payment of their
professional fees. Under this law, it had been held that the priv-
ilege did not affect "property" obtained in execution or satisfac-
tion of the judgment.2 By Act 124 of 1906 this privilege was
made operative "on all judgments obtained by them, and on all
property recovered thereby."3 In State ex rel. Maitrejean v.
Demarest4 the attorney sought the recognition of a privilege
under this statute, on property received by the husband in a
partition of the community incident to a judgment of separation
from bed and board. The court followed the well-established
principle of strict construction in the matter of privileges which
are in derogation of the general rule of proration among credit-
ors. The privilege was denied because the share of the com-
munity property which fell to the husband had belonged to him
all along and was not "property recovered" under a judgment,
within the meaning of the statute. Of course, the attorney's time
and services are the same in one case as in another; and there
is no denial of his claim as a creditor. Nevertheless, the rule of
stricti juris supports the decision in this case.
CROP PLEDGE
The crop pledge has been an important security device in
Louisiana agriculture because it enables the farmer to get credit
on the strength of his future crop. To preserve the effectiveness
of the security in the event of sale of the crop, it has been held
4. 228 La. 931, 84 So.2d 464 (1955).
* Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. LA. R.S. 128, 2897 (1870).
2. Luneau v. Edwards, 39 La. Ann. 876, 2 So. 24 (1887) ; Weill v. Levi, 40
La. Ann. 135, 3 So. 559 (1888).
3. LA. R.S. 9:5001 (1950).
4. 229 La. 300, 85 So.2d 522 (1956).
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that the purchaser may be held liable for loss to the creditor on
the theory that he became a joint tortfeaser with the pledgor who
wrongfully made the sale.5 Since the crop pledge must be duly
recorded, the first purchaser might have been held liable on the
ground of constructive notice of the public records, instead of
performing the legal gymnastic of bending to the form of a .tort
and a joint tortfeasor. Be that as it may, subsequent purchasers
were not held liable because beyond the first purchaser the prop-
erty is no longer "crop" but "an article of commerce."6
In Soileau v. Gibbs7 the promissory note secured by a duly re-
corded crop pledge was acquired by the plaintiff, and the trial
court held the purchasers liable on the tort theory of Alexandria
Production Credit Association v. Horn.8 However, this was re-
versed by the Supreme Court and an exception of no right of
action was sustained on the ground that the plaintiff was not the
original pledgee and there was no legal or express conventional
subrogation in his favor. On the basis of the tort and joint tort-
feasor theory, there might not need to be such privity of contract
to sustain liability. Accordingly, the Supreme Court's reversal
is significant not only for its holding but also because it might
be indicative of the court's pulling back a little from that tort
and joint tortfeasor theory for sustaining liability of third per-
sons in crop pledge cases.
BUILDING CONSTRUCTION PRIVILEGES
The provisions of the Building Contract Law9 contemplate
three different fact situations: (1) where written contract and
proper bond are duly executed and recorded, (2) where the con-
tract has been recorded but there is something defective as to
the bond (no bond, insufficient bond, improper surety, bond not
furnished or recorded within proper time), and (3) where there
is no written contract or where the contract is not recorded.
The first situation is the most regular and most protected for
all parties concerned, and the principal statutory provisions for
this situation are in Sections R.S. 9:4801-4805. The particulari-
5. Alexandria Production Credit Association v. Horn, 199 So. 430 (La. App.
1941).
6. Loeb v. Collier, 131 La. 377, 59 So. 816 (1912).
7. 229 La. 976, 87 So.2d 312 (1956).
8. 199 So. 430 (La. App. 1941).
9. LA. R.S. 9:4801-4807 (1950).
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ties of the second situation are covered in Section 4806, and for
the third situation the special provisions are in Section 4812.
On some matters, the statute has one rule for all three situa-
tions; on several points there are separate and different rules
which are applicable wherever so provided. One of these points
of difference is the time within which claims must be filed in
order to constitute valid privileges against the property. For the
first kind of situation (proper contract and bond, duly recorded),
the pertinent statutory provision in Section 4802 fixes the delay
at 30 days after notice of acceptance or default. For the second
situation (recorded contract but defect as to bond), the statutory
time for filing claims is fixed at the same delay of 30 days by
Section 4806, which incorporates by cross-reference the rules of
Sections 4802 and 4803. For the third situation (no written or
recorded contract), Section 4812 of the statute provides that
claims must be filed within 60 days after last delivery of material
or last performance of service in order to constitute a privilege
against the property.
In Schwartz Supply Co. v. Zimmerman'0 there was a recorded
contract but the contractor gave no surety bond. In due course
the building was completed and a notice of acceptance was duly
recorded in the proper mortgage office. When certain unpaid
materialmen filed their claims, more than 30 days had elapsed
but less than 60. They claimed the benefit of Section 4812 allow-
ing 60 days, but the court applied the 30 day term of Sections
4806 and 4802, which was the proper rule for this example of the
second type of fact situation, where there was a recorded con-
tract but no bond.
In reaching its decision in this case, the court seemed to rely
in some measure on the rule of interpretation that laws in pari
materia must be construed with reference to each other. How-
ever, since Section 4806 incorporated by express cross-reference
this rule of Section 4802, there is direct and express statutory
coverage of the problem involved. In any event, it is clear that
Section 4812 was properly held inapplicable.
VEHICLE CERTIFICATE OF TITLE ACT
In Commercial Securities Co. v. Hugh Roberson Motors,
Inc.," an automobile dealer executed a floor plan mortgage in the
10. 228 La. 861, 84 So.2d 438 (1955).
11. 229 La. 959, 87 So.2d 306 (1956).
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morning and sold the car in question to another dealer later the
same day. The chattel mortgage was received and filed in the
proper office on the following day. The trial court held that a
purchaser without knowledge or notice and before the recorda-
tion of a chattel mortgage obtained perfect title free and clear
of the mortgage. A subsequent purchaser likewise acquired per-
fect title from his author. The court of appeal reversed 12 on the
ground that the act provided a series of requirements culminat-
ing in the issuance of an official title certificate, and in the pres-
ent case the chattel mortgage had been duly received and filed
prior to the application by the ultimate purchaser (third oppo-
nent) for an official title certificate which then showed the en-
cumbrance.
The Supreme Court reversed again and reinstated the judg-
ment of the trial court, citing its own decision in Hindelang v.
Collard Motors, Inc. 8 Since this earlier case was decided in 1942
and before the first adoption of the Vehicle Certificate of Title
Act in 1950, the decision in the present case does not directly
answer the issues raised by the court of appeal concerning the
point of time at which a purchaser now acquires perfect title to
an automobile. Inferentially, it asserts the unchanged applica-
bility of the general rules of the Civil Code on sales 14 that title
passes when the contract is completed (and this is absolutely
beyond question after delivery and payment). Further, the pres-
ent decision must be considered as classifying an automobile pur-
chaser as a "third person" within the meaning of the chattel
mortgage ranking provision of the Vehicle Certificate of Title
Act,15 although he has not yet complied with other provisions of
the same statute concerning the procurement of an official title
certificate. The present decision may create some doubts about
the basic policy objectives of the Vehicle Certificate of Title Act,
and clarification would be in order at the first opportunity.
12. 77 So.2d 591 (La. App. 1955).
13. 200 La. 569, 8 So.2d 600 (1942).
14. LA. CIVIL CODE arts. 1922, 1923, 2441, 2446 (1870).
15. LA. R.S. 32:710 (1950), the pertinent part of which provides that the
chattel mortgage is effective against "third persons" only from the time of proper
inscription in the office of the commissioner.
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